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Abstract
Private comparison is a primitive for many cryptographic tasks, and recently several schemes for the quantum private comparison
(QPC) have been proposed, where two users can compare the equality of their secrets with the help of a semi-honest third party (TP)
without knowing each other’s secret and without disclosing the same to the TP. In the exisiting schemes, secrecy is obtained by using
conjugate coding, and considering all participants as quantum users who can perform measurement(s) and/or create states in basis
other than computational basis. In contrast, here we propose two new protocols for QPC, first of which does not use conjugate coding
(uses orthogonal states only) and the second one allows the users other than TP to be classical whose activities are restricted to either
reflecting a quantum state or measuring it in computational basis. Further, the performance of the protocols is evaluated under various
noise models.
Keywords: quantum private comparison, secure multiparty computation, socialist millionaire problem, quantum cryptography, noise
models, quantum communication in noisy environment
1 Introduction
One of the most important branches of classical and quantum cryptography is secure multi-party computation (SMC) ( [1, 2] and
references therein). SMC is a primitive for distributed computation. It enables the distributed computing of correct output of a
function in a situation, where the inputs are given by a group of mutually distrustful users. A SMC is required to be fair, and secure.
Specifically, it should not leak the secret inputs of the individual players. Efforts have been made to achieve this in various ways, both
classically [1,3,4] and quantum mechanically [5–10]. However, in those efforts [5,6,10], it has been assumed that some of the users
follow the protocol honestly (which implies that some of the users are semi-honest). Among the variants of SMC schemes, a specific
variant having particular importance is “socialist millionaire problem” which was first introduced by Yao [1] in 1982 as a computing
task where two millionaires (Alice and Bob) wish to know who is richer without disclosing the amount of their wealth to each other.
Subsequently, Boudot et al. [3], modified it to a task where the millionaires are only interested to know whether they are equally rich
or not. Thus, they wish to compute a function f(iA, jB) : f(iA, jB) = a 6= b = f(iA, iB), where the subscripts A and B represent
inputs from Alice and Bob, respectively. Thus, iA and iB are essentially classical information corresponding to the assets of Alice
and Bob, and a scheme for Boudot’s version of the socialist millionaire problem is actually a scheme for private comparison of
equality of information. A lot of work has been done on classical private comparison, but as the security of all classical cryptographic
schemes are conditional, it can never lead to an unconditionally secure scheme of private comparison. In contrast, we can achieve
unconditional security in the quantum world. This fact led to many proposals for private comparison of equality of information using
quantum resources [2, 5–9, 11–20], we may refer to all such protocols as protocols for “quantum private comparison (QPC)”. Before
we proceed further, it would be apt to note that QPC problem, the socialist millionaire problem and Tierce problem [3] are equivalent,
and in what follows we will mostly refer to all such problems as QPC problem.
In the original definition of socialist millionaire problem, it was a two-party computation task, but a pioneering work of Lo [21]
established that two-party secure QPC is not possible. This implies that to implement a secure QPC, we must have a third party (TP),
who would assist the users to compare the equality of their secrets. Interestingly, the TP may be semi-honest [5, 6], semi-honest
having an intelligent robot [10], dishonest [13], or almost-dishonest [11]. Despite, the strong proof of Lo, some efforts have been
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made to achieve QPC without TP [22,23], but they have been found to be insecure and/or unfair [24]. Thus, in what follows, we will
concentrate on three party protocols of QPC, where a TP helps Alice and Bob to compare the equality of their information. Such
protocols for QPC have been proposed using different types of entangled states. For example, in Ref. [5], a scheme for QPC has been
proposed using χ-type state,W state was used in Ref. [12], Bell state was used in [6, 7, 13], GHZ state was used in [11]. Further, in
Ref. [25], a group theoretic structure of the protocols of quantum dialogue was proposed using a large number of different types of
entangled states (e.g.,W, GHZ, cluster, Q4,Q5, and Brown states), and it was shown that the quantum dialogue scheme proposed
there can be converted to a protocol of the socialist millionaire problem, which is equivalent to QPC. Thus, in [25], several options
for realization of protocols for QPC were provided. Further, in the similar line, in [26], a set of new options (e.g., 4-qubit Ω state,
4-qubit cat state, etc.) for realization of QD, and thus, QPC have been proposed.
It’s already established that the schemes for QPC have useful applications in private bidding and auctions, secret ballot elections,
e-commerce, etc. ( [8] and references therein). Due to the fact that a scheme for QPC has applications in many fields, many variants
of QPC have been studied in the recent past. For example, Huang et al., have recently proposed a GHZ-state-based QPC scheme
for n users [11]. Huang et al.’s scheme considers an almost-dishonest TP and allows him to compare the equality of the secrets of a
subset of users, too.
In what follows, we plan to propose two protocols for QPC in the line of modified Tseng-Lin-Hwang (TLH) protocol, which was
proposed in its original form in 2012 [6]. In the original TLH protocol a scheme for quantum private comparison was proposed using
Bell states, but almost immediately after the publication of TLH scheme, Yang et al., [13] had shown that there exist a security flaw in
the original TLH scheme and other similar schemes, which assume TP to be semi-honest. Yang et al., [13] also proposed a modified
scheme which they claimed to be free from the limitations of the previous protocols as their scheme considered a dishonest TP.
Subsequently, in an interesting work on cryptanalysis of Yang et al.’s scheme, it was observed by Zhang et al., [14] that Yang et al.’s
scheme was also not completely secure. Keeping these facts in mind, here we aim to propose two schemes of QPC that are free from
the attacks described earlier and are fundamentally different from all the existing schemes of QPC as one of the proposed schemes is
semi-quantum in nature and the other one is a completely orthogonal-state-based scheme. Here it would be apt to note that protocols
based on orthogonal states alone and semi-quantum protocols are foundationally different from usual conjugate-coding based (BB84-
type) protocols. This is so because, in contrast to common perception developed by BB84-type schemes, orthogonal-state-based
schemes establish the fact that unconditional security does not originate from the conjugate coding (our inability to simultaneously
measure a quantum state using two or more MUBs). Further, semi-quantum schemes establish that all parties involved in performing
the cryptographic tasks do not require to be quantum. A brief review of the existing orthogonal-state-based and semi-quantum
schemes for various quantum cryptographic task is provided in the next section. The review clearly shows that to the best of our
knowledge, there does not exist any orthogonal-state-based or semi-quantum scheme for QPC. This fact further sets the motivation
for designing such schemes for the first time.
In a practical situation, all communication schemes are affected by the noise present in the communication channel. So it’s
extremely important to know howQPC schemes behave in the presence of noise. Recently, some efforts have beenmade to investigate
the effect of noise on QPC schemes. For example, the effects of Pauli noise [15], and collective amplitude damping [16] have been
studied very recently. However, to the best of our knowledge, no serious effort has yet been made to rigorously investigate the effect
of a complete set of possible noise models on the schemes of QPC. This letter aims to do that for the protocols proposed in this letter.
Remaining part of the letter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we have proposed two schemes of QPC that are fundamentally
different from the existing schemes of QPC. In Section 3, the security and efficiency of the proposed schemes are analyzed. The effect
of various types of noise models on the proposed schemes is investigated in Section 4. Finally, the letter is concluded in Section 5.
2 Protocols for quantum private comparison
In this section, we introduce two protocols for QPC. The first one is an orthogonal-state-based protocol, and the second one is a
semi-quantum protocol. Here, we assume that Alice and Bob wish to compare their assets with the help of a TP.
2.1 Orthogonal-state-based protocol for quantum private comparison
In quantum cryptography, orthogonal-state-based protocols are of fundamental interest as in contrast to BB84 type conjugate coding
based protocol, where the security arises from the conjugate coding or noncommutivity, here (i.e., in case of orthogonal-state-based
schemes), the security arises from the duality (monogamy of entanglement) for single particle (multipartite entangled) states. The
first ever orthogonal-state-based scheme of QKD was introduced in 1995 [27], and is now known as GV protocol. Since then several
quantum cryptographic schemes based on orthogonal states have been proposed for various cryptographic tasks. For example,
orthogonal-state-based schemes have been proposed for QKA [28], QSDC [29–31], DSQC [29, 31, 32], CDSQC [33], etc. A few of
these schemes have also been experimentally realized [34]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no effort has yet been made to
design an orthogonal-state-based protocol for quantum private comparison. In what follows, the same is proposed in 8 steps, which
are denoted by (OSB1,OSB2, · · ·OSB8), where OSB stands for orthogonal-state-based. This notation is adopted to distinguish
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steps of this protocol from the steps of our second protocol, which is a semi-quantum scheme, and whose steps are denoted by
(SQ1, · · ·SQ9), where SQ stands for semi-quantum. The proposed orthogonal-state-based scheme works as follows:
OSB1: TP prepares 2N -EPR pairs randomly chosen from the set of four Bell states
{
|ψ±〉 = |00〉±|11〉√
2
, |φ±〉 = |01〉±|10〉√
2
}
. TP
prepares two quantum sequences, namely SA and SB , which contain all the first and second particles of the EPR pairs,
respectively.
Thus, both SA and SB , contain 2N qubits, and if a sequence is transmitted via quantum channel, we would require to check
half of the travel qubits for eavesdropping. The same can be done by adding 2N decoy qubits in each sequence.
OSB2: TP prepares two copies of |ψ+〉N . He uses the first (second) copy as a set of decoy qubits DA (DB) to be randomly
inserted in the sequence SA (SB) to perform eavesdropping check using GV-subroutine (detail of GV-subroutine can be found
in [30, 31, 35]). Specifically, TP randomly inserts DA in SA (DB in SB) to obtain a new enlarged sequence S
⋆
A (S
⋆
B). Later,
he sends the quantum sequence S⋆A to Alice and S
⋆
B to Bob.
OSB3: After receiving quantum sequences S⋆A/B Alice/Bob perform GV subroutine for eavesdropping check with the help of TP.
They compute the error rate, if this error rate is more than a predetermined allowed threshold value, then they abort the protocol
and restarts from OSB1 considering that an eavesdropper is present. Otherwise, they proceed to the next step.
As the eavesdropping is checked by measuring the decoy qubits, after this step, Alice and Bob are left with SA and SB ,
respectively, because they remove the qubits measured for eavesdropping check.
OSB4: Qubits of SA and SB are now measured in the computational basis by Alice and Bob, respectively. Both would individually
obtain 2N -bits key strings of bit values 0 and 1 corresponding to the measurement outcomes |0〉 and |1〉, respectively.
In half of the shared secret bits, they can check correlations to enhance security against disturbance attacks by Eve. The reduced
bit string of N -bits with Alice (Bob) is denoted asKA (KB).
OSB5: Alice and Bob prepare a shared key KAB of N -bits using an orthogonal-state-based scheme of QKD [27] or quantum key
agreement (QKA) [28].
OSB6: Alice and Bob have the private information regarding their assets which they wish to compare. Consider that the private
information of Alice and Bob is represented by the bit stringsMA andMB , respectively. Alice encrypts her secretMA with
her key stringKA and shared keyKAB by using an exclusive-OR operation to obtainC
i
A =
(
M iA ⊕KiA ⊕KiAB
)
. Meanwhile,
Bob also encrypts his messageMB with keysKB andKAB by using the same operation to obtainC
i
B =
(
M iB ⊕KiB ⊕KiAB
)
.
Here, the superscript i denotes the ith bit of theN -bits string. Alice and Bob send the calculated stringsCA and CB separately
to TP via a public channel.
OSB7: TP generates a classical bit string CTP of N -bits corresponding to the choice of the initial Bell states in OSB1, such that for
the ith Bell state being |ψ±〉 (|φ±〉) he generates ith bit value in CTP as 0 (1).
OSB8: TP computesR, which is now exclusive-OR result of CA, CB , and CTP as R = (CA ⊕ CB ⊕ CTP ). The bit value 0 (1) of
Ri corresponds to the same (different) values ofM iA andM
i
B. Thus, iff R
i = 0 : ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} both Alice and Bob have
the same amount of assets. Checking values of Ri, TP announces whether Alice and Bob have equal amount of assets.
Interestingly, following similar argument, the existing controlled QD scheme proposed by some of the present authors in Ref. [36]
can also be modified to design a completely orthogonal-state-based QPC protocol. However, we are not interested to elaborately
discuss another orthogonal-state-based scheme. Instead, here, we prefer to propose another foundationally relevant scheme which
can work with limited quantum resources.
2.2 Semi-quantum protocol for quantum private comparison
Now, we would try to design a semi-quantum protocol for QPC. In which, TP would be considered as the only quantum party (i.e.,
possess quantum resources) while both Alice and Bob are classical parties. In convention, a classical party can only access and
process classical piece of information, i.e., can only work in the computational basis [37–40]. Thus, being classical user, Alice
and Bob can only measure and prepare qubits in computational basis. Additionally, they can reflect the qubits without disturbing
them. The first semi-quantum protocol of key distribution (SQKD) was introduced in 2007 [38, 39]. In which an unconditionally
secure quantum key was shared between a classical and quantum party by using measure and resend [38–40] and permutation of
particles [40] techniques to avoid eavesdropping. In what follows, we refer to these two equivalent techniques (i.e., the schemes
discussed in Refs. [38–40]) for eavesdropping checking as semi-quantum subroutine. The protocol proposed in Ref. [39] was widely
discussed and was followed by a set of SQKD protocols ( [37] and references therein), semi-quantum DSQC [41], etc. A protocol
for semi-quantum private comparison (SQPC) is described below. In the protocol proposed below, we will assume that Alice and
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Alice’s Bob’s TP’s measurement outcome
choice choice Initial state |ψ+〉 Initial state |φ+〉
Case 1 R R |ψ+〉 |φ+〉
Case 2 M R |ψ±〉 |φ±〉
Case 3 R M |ψ±〉 |φ±〉
Case 4 M M |ψ±〉 |φ±〉
Table 1: All possible cases that may appear in a semi-quantum private comparison scheme are summarized in this table. Here,
both the classical users can either choose to measure or reflect half of the qubits, randomly and independently. We have explicitly
shown all the cases when the initial state was |ψ+〉 or |φ+〉. It is only Case 4, which is of interest, because only this case leads to
successful key sharing between Alice and Bob. Case 1 is used for eavesdropping checking, i.e., TP’s announcement “1” for the qubits
corresponding to Case 1 may be considered as the signature of disturbance caused by Eve.
Bob share a secure key KAB , which has been distributed/produced using SQKD protocol proposed in Ref. [37], in which Alice and
Bob restricted to classical resources can share a quantum key [37]. We further assume that Alice (Bob) prepares an unconditionally
secure key KAT (KBT ) in collaboration with quantum enabled TP using a semi-quantum key agreement (SQKA) protocol [52].
In other words, we assume that Alice (Bob) knows KAB and KAT (KAB and KBT ) before the start of the following protocol for
semi-quantum private comparison.
SQ1: Same as OSB1, with the only difference that the number of EPR states prepared is ≈ 8N.
SQ2: TP sends the two sequences SA and SB to the classical users Alice and Bob, respectively. As mentioned beforehand, the
classical users can only perform two operations, i.e., either “measure and resend” in the computational basis or “reflect” the
qubit without any change.
SQ3: Both the users measure half of the received qubits (i.e., ≈ 4N qubits) randomly in computational basis and replace them with
the freshly prepared qubits in the same basis in accordance with the measurement outcome. They also store the bit values
obtained in their measurement outcome corresponding to each measured qubit.
SQ4: After receiving all the qubits from Alice and Bob, TP performs Bell measurements on the received pairs of qubits (i.e., SiA
and SiB). A particular measurement would yield one of the Bell states. If TP’s measurement yields the same Bell state as was
initially prepared by him, he announces 0, otherwise he announces 1.
Out of ≈ 8N initial Bell states, in SQ3, both Alice and Bob randomly measure one half of the received qubits. Therefore,
for a particular pair of qubits (ith Bell state, which was prepared initially), there are four possible cases as listed below and
summarized in Table 1.
Case 1: Both Alice and Bob reflect the incoming qubits undisturbed. This case may not be useful in sharing a key between
Alice and Bob, but it can be used for eavesdropping checking. As in the absence (presense) of an eavesdropper and/or noise
the initial state prepared by TP and the final state obtained by him as the outcome of his Bell measurement should be the same
(different in 75% cases).
Case 2 and Case 3: Either Alice or Bob measures the qubit while the other party reflects it. All these cases will be discarded
as these cases are neither useful in sharing key nor for eavesdropping checking.
Case 4: Both Alice and Bob perform measurements in computational basis on the qubits received by them, and store the
measurement outcome (0 or 1) to be used in the future. This case would lead to a key.
SQ5: After the announcement of TP, both Alice and Bob disclose the coordinates of the qubits they have measured. Subsequently,
both of themmake two separate lists corresponding to qubits falling in Cases 1 and 4. Then, Alice and Bob check eavesdropping
using semi-quantum subroutine using qubits of Case 1. In which, both the classical parties ensure that TP’s measurement
outcome is 0 when both have reflected the qubits (Case 1). In this case, about one-fourth of the initial states (i.e., ≈ 2N Bell
states) will be used for eavesdropping checking. If the errors are found to be lower than a tolerable limit, they proceed to the
next step, otherwise they discard the scheme, and restart from SQ1.
On the successful completion of this step (i.e., if the error rate is found to be less than the tolerable limit), Alice and Bob obtain
KA2N andKB2N , respectively, whereKA2N andKB2N are correlated strings of length ≈ 2N -bits.
SQ6: On request of Alice and Bob, TP discloses his initial choices of Bell states for N cases, that are selected randomly. Subse-
quently, using the values of KiA2N andK
i
B2N
, Alice and Bob compare the parity values for the Bell states prepared by TP and
the bit values obtained by them for all N cases. If it matches, they proceed, otherwise they abort.
This would check whether TP had genuinely prepared a Bell state or not, which in turn would ensure the correlation in the
reducedN -bit stringsKA andKB .
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SQ7: Same as OSB6 with the only difference that Alice (Bob) encrypts her (his) secret MA (MB) with her (his) key string
KA (KB), key shared with Bob (Alice) KAB , and TP KAT (KBT ) by using an exclusive-OR operation to obtain C
i
A =(
M iA ⊕KiA ⊕KiAB ⊕KiAT
)
(CiB =
(
M iB ⊕KiB ⊕KiAB ⊕KiBT
)
. before announcing the strings CA and CB separately to
TP via a public channel.
SQ8: Same as OSB7.
SQ9: Same as OSB8 with a minor change in TP’s calculation ofRi, which is exclusive-OR result of CA, CB , CTP ,KAT , andKBT
as R = (CA ⊕ CB ⊕ CTP ⊕KAT ⊕KBT ).
3 Analysis of security and efficiency of the proposed protocols
Before we analyze the security of the proposed protocols, it would be beneficial to summarize the information known (or unknown)
to each party. To be specific, in both the protocols proposed in the last section, TP has the information of the initial Bell states, which
is unknown to both Alice and Bob. This ensures 1 bit of ignorance for both Alice and Bob. This is so because the initial Bell states
can be distinguished as parity 0 (|ψ±〉) state and parity 1 (|φ±〉) state. For a parity 0 (1) state the final key bits obtained by Alice and
Bob would be the same (complementary of each other). Hence, the ignorance due to the lack of knowledge about the initial Bell state
is 1 bit. Interestingly, the initial choice of Bell states also ensure 1 bit of ignorance for TP as he has knowledge about the parity of
the initial Bell state, but he does not know whether Alice’s (or Bob’s) measurement outcome was 0 or 1. Further, Alice (Bob) has the
shared quantum key KAB and correlated key KA (KB), which are not known to TP. It is evident that anyone interested to know the
secrets of Alice and/or Bob (MA and/orMB) would require all three parts of information.
Firstly, it should be ensured that a sequence of qubits transmitted via a quantum channel has been received by the receiver in a
secure manner as an unintended external attacker may employ an intercept-resend or entangle-measure attack. To ensure that any
such eavesdropping attack is detected, one needs to check half of the travel qubits. This is why, N decoy qubits are inserted in each
sequence sent to Alice and Bob by TP in OSB1 in the orthogonal-state-based protocol proposed here. This is essential because it
would provide an upper bound on the errors in the qubits not checked for eavesdropping, and the error would become asymptotically
small for large values of N [42]. In the semi-quantum protocol, the security against an outsider attacker has been obtained from the
qubits reflected by both Alice and Bob (already discussed as Case 1 in SQ4). Specifically, in this particular case, in the absence of an
eavesdropper and/or noise the initial state prepared by TP and the final state obtained by him as the outcome of his Bell measurement
should be the same. However, the presence of noise and eavesdropper can lead to other Bell states. Thus, if TP prepares |ψ+〉 (|φ+〉)
and obtains any other state at the end, he can conclude that there is an eavesdropper or noise, but the converse is not true. However,
since N ≫ 1, any effort of eavesdropping will always be detected. Further, in SQ6, Alice and Bob check the parity of their bits in
half of the cases with the TP’s announcement of the initial choice of Bell state. This would check whether TP had genuinely prepared
a Bell state or not, which in turn would ensure the correlation in the reducedN -bit stringsKA and KB. This disclosure will also be
relevant in some of the intercept and resend attacks of dishonest Alice or Bob. Instead of trying to extract the useful information, Eve
may also choose to disturb the protocol. For example, in the orthogonal-state-based QPC protocol, she may apply a Pauli operation
iY on all the qubits traveling from TP to Alice without disturbing Bob’s qubits. Alice would not be able to detect this attack using the
GV subroutine as in OSB2 all the decoy Bell states were prepared as |ψ+〉 and those would remain unchanged after this operation,
while parity of the qubits used for preparing the key will change completely (when compared with that of the Bell state prepared by
TP). Specifically, as a consequence of this attack, TP would be forced to announce incorrect results in two cases: (i) when every bit in
MA andMB are the same, and (ii) when every bit inMA andMB are different, and Alice and Bob would not succeed to detect this
attack. As mentioned previously, Eve cannot extract any information encoded by Alice or Bob through this attack, but she may force
Alice and Bob to reach at a wrong conclusion, which is not desirable. This undesirable situation can be circumvented by introducing
an additional security checking (as mentioned in OSB4), where Alice and Bob check correlations in a part of the secure strings shared
by them with the help of TP. This correlation check would reveal whether Eve has adopted the above mentioned attack strategy.
Now, we can consider various possible attacks by each party to gain the information not accessible to them. For example, TP
can try to take benefit of state preparation by preparing a state other than Bell state to gain advantage by entanglement swapping
attack [14]. In fact, he can prepare an arbitrary quantum state to exploit the state preparation, and try to extract correlated keys KA
and KB. However, the unconditional security of the quantum key KAB would maintain security against any such attempt as both
Alice and Bob encrypt their messages regarding asset informationMA andMB, respectively using the quantum key KAB . In other
words, it can be viewed as Alice and Bob performing communication in a secure manner by using a quantum key and the security
of message can be attributed completely to the security of the quantum key. Additionally, Alice (Bob) may wish to extract Bob’s
(Alice’s) key KB (KA) by designing an intercept and resend attack [14]. The eavesdropping checking mechanism adopted in both
the protocols (by GV and semi-quantum subroutines, respectively) ensures security against this kind of an attack. It may be noted
that the eavesdropping checking procedure adopted here would provide security against both insider and outsider attackers.
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A modified intercept and resend attack strategy by a classical Alice (Bob) in SQPC scheme could be to intercept all the qubits
sent to Bob (Alice) and keep them in a memory. Though, possession of a quantum memory by a classical party is beyond his/her
limits, but it is an interesting scenario to be investigated. Suppose Alice measures half of the qubits which TP has sent to her, and
follows the same for the corresponding Bob’s qubits in her possession. Depending upon the outcomes of her measurement, Alice
prepares new qubits and sends (the same number of qubits TP would have sent) them to Bob after adding the remaining auxiliary
qubits. Bob proceeds with the protocol as expected, then Alice intercepts all the qubits Bob returns to TP and replaces them with the
qubits (initially sent by TP to Bob) in her possession. Using this approach, (ifKBT is not used) she will getKB completely as it will
be prepared using a subset of the string of qubits, she had measured and sent to Bob. Using a modification of this attack, she may
decide to not to intercept qubits from TP to Bob and still perform a similar attack. Specifically, Alice (or equivalently Bob) can also
extract all the information of Bob by intercepting all the qubits that Bob has sent to TP and measuring the pair qubits of each qubit
that Alice had measured. None of these two attacks can be detected using the semi-quantum subroutine alone. However, these attacks
can be circumvented by allowing Alice and Bob to prepare individual quantum keys with quantum enabled TP using SQKA protocol
(as proposed in Ref. [52]). The use of SQKA scheme instead of a SQKD scheme would allow the protocol to succeed even when the
TP is not honest. Now, using SQKA scheme, if Alice and TP (Bob and TP) prepare a keyKAT (KBT ), and Alice and Bob use these
additional keysKAT andKBT to encode their messagesMA andMB, respectively (as described in SQ7), then the above mentioned
attacks can be circumvented. This is easy to observe that in the modified scheme, by performing one of the above mentioned attacks
though Alice would obtainKB , which would not help her to deduceMB as she is completely ignorant aboutKBT .
Additionally, it is worth noting that the SQPC protocol intrinsically uses a scheme for QKD to obtain its security against the
untrusted TP and external attackers. Thus, a QKD scheme, which is unconditionally secure [27, 34, 37, 43] and composable [44], is
used here to provide security from attackers other than Alice and Bob (primarily from the malicious TP). To ensure this security, Alice
and Bob are required to be honest as they do not have a better strategy (to protect their individual secret from the malicious TP) than
to honestly share a key. Here, we may note that composability [45] of QKD plays a crucial role here as it specifies additional security
criteria that must be fulfilled in order for QKD to be composed with other tasks to form a larger application like QPC. Moreover,
we may note that the criteria for composability would be more stringent in a situation (like QPC) that involves mutually mistrustful
parties (see [46] for details). Further, unlike the orthogonal-state-based protocol for QPC which uses QKA involving both dishonest
parties, in SQPC, Alice and Bob share a quantum key using a semi-quantumKD protocol [37], which does not allow any one of them
to solely decide the entire key (thus, the QKD scheme used here can be viewed as a weaker version of QKA) as the QKD scheme
considered here puts both Alice and Bob on the same footing. This is so because the untrusted TP prepares Bell states and shares
among Alice and Bob to form a symmetric key. Consequently, neither Alice nor Bob can control the whole key. Finally, iff both
of them encrypt their information with this symmetric key KAB, the result at the TP’s end will have a R which would be free from
the contribution of key. This fact has been exploited in some of the recent proposals where the competing parties share a quantum
key [5, 14, 18] or a random number [13] honestly for security against untrusted TP.
The qubit efficiency of the proposed QPC protocols can be calculated using the quantitative measure proposed in Refs. [47].
The efficiency η = cq+b , where c number of classical bits are transmitted using the total number of q qubits, and b-bits classical
communication is involved. It should be noted that only the classical communication used for decoding the message is considered,
not the classical communication required for eavesdropping checking. In both the orthogonal-state-based QPC and SQPC protocols,
Alice and Bob share theirN -bit secrets, contributing equally in c = 2N . The orthogonal-state-basedQPC involves 4N qubits, which
are shared in a secure manner using 4N number of additional decoy qubits. Finally, Alice and Bob announce CA/B of N -bits each
which is followed by 1 bit of classical communication by TP (i.e., the announcement that discloses whether the assets are equal (say,
0) or not (say, 1)). Additionally, Alice and Bob also share a quantum key and the qubits and bits used to obtain this shared key should
also be counted in the computation of efficiency. Here, we have chosen orthogonal-state-based QKA scheme [28] for considering
the resources involved in sharing the quantum key. Using Shukla et al.’s scheme [28], and exploiting the dense coding capacity of
the quantum channel used, an N -bit quantum key can be shared by two parties using 4N qubits (2N as quantum channel and 2N
decoy qubits), which involves 3N -bit classical communication. Therefore, total number of qubits used are q = 12N with additional
classical communication b = 5N + 1. Thus, the efficiency of the orthogonal-state-based QPC protocol would be η = 2N17N+1 , which
becomes 11.76% for largeN .
Similarly, in case of SQPC protocol, 16N qubits are initially prepared by TP, subsequently 8N qubits are prepared by Alice and
Bob (4N by each) as a replacement of the qubits measured by them. TP announces 8N bit measurement outcomes which Alice and
Bob use to generate their keys with the help of 4N bit of classical messages available with each of them. Finally, Alice and Bob
both share anN -bit encrypted messages which helps TP to obtain and announce 1 bit final result. Additionally, both classical parties
also share a secure quantum key [37] for which they use 24N bits (i.e., TP initially prepares 16N qubits, and Alice (Bob) prepares
additional 4N (4N ) qubits). Similar to the SQPC protocol, during key distibution TP also announces 8N -bit information which is
followed by 4N -bit announcement by both Alice and Bob. It is important to note that Alice and Bob keep the bit values only for
specific announcements by TP. Here, we have considered the asymptotic case where equal probabilities for favorable and unfavorable
measurement outcomes of TP has been considered. In the present SQPC protocol, TP had also shared one unconditionally secure
quantum key with each classical user using a SQKA scheme [52], which involves 5N qubits and 5N bits for each N -bit shared key.
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Using all these values, the efficiency of the SQPC protocol is η = 2N102N+1 . For large values of N , η ≈ 1.96%. Thus, the protocol 1
proposed here is more efficient than the protocol 2, which is not surprising as we have considered two classical users in the second
protocol.
Here, it would be worth mentioning that in analogy with the classical communication involved in eavesdropping checking process
(which is not counted in computation of η), we have not counted the classical bits that are used to check correlations between KA
andKB .
4 Effect of different noise models on the proposed protocols
In this section, we aim to study the effect of a set of noise models on the feasibility of both the QPC schemes proposed here. For this
we will use the operator sum representation of a transformed quantum state (ρ′), initially prepared in ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, which is
ρ′ =
n∑
i
KiρK
†
i . (1)
Here, the operators satisfying
n∑
i
K
†
iKi = I ensure the trace-preserving nature of the quantum channel. In what follows, first we will
describe the Kraus operators of the noise channels and mathematical formulation used in the present letter. Subsequently, we will
analyze both of the proposed schemes under the effect of various noise models. Specifically, we will consider the amplitude damping
(AD) channel, bit flip channels, phase flip channels and depolarizing channels. Let us first describe an AD channel, which causes the
loss of energy from the system to its surrounding considered as a reservoir at vacuum.
1. Amplitude damping: The Kraus operators for AD channels [42] are EAD0 =
(
1 0
0
√
1− p
)
and EAD1 =
(
0
√
p
0 0
)
. Here,
and in what follows, p is the probability of error due to the specific noise discussed.
We will also study the effect of Pauli noise, which affects the qubit independent of its initial state with a certain probability and leaves
it unaffected with the remaining probability. The error caused due to this kind of noise can be studied as bit flip (BF), phase flip (PF),
and depolarizing channel (DC) noise.
2. Bit flip channels: The BF channel, which flips the qubit with probability p and leaves it unchanged with remaining probability,
can be given by the Kraus operators [42] EBF0 =
√
1− p
(
1 0
0 1
)
and EBF1 =
√
p
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
3. Phase Flip channels: Similar to the BF channels, the Kraus operators for a phase flip channel are given by [42] EPF0 =√
1− p
(
1 0
0 1
)
and EPF1 =
√
p
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, which flips the phase of the qubits with p probability while identity acts
with the remaining probability. It is interesting that the effect of phase damping noise on certain scheme can be reduced from
the obtained results for phase flip channels ( [48] and references therein), so we have not explicitly studied the phase damping
kind of noise.
4. Depolarizing channels: If the noisy channels leaves the state unchanged with a certain probability and completely mixed with
the remaining probability, the Kraus operators for such a channel would be [42] EDC0 =
√
1− p
(
1 0
0 1
)
, EDC1 =
√
p
3
(
0 1
1 0
)
, EDC2 =
√
p
3
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, and EDC3 =
√
p
3
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
In both the QPC schemes proposed here, TP initially prepares one of the Bell states and shares that with two distant parties. Therefore,
ρ will be a two qubit density matrix evolving under two independent quantum channels. Mathematically, the transformed density
matrix can be written as
ρ′ =
∑
i,j
Eki (p1)⊗ Elj (p2) ρ
(
Eki (p1)⊗ Elj (p2)
)†
, (2)
where pi corresponds to the probability of decoherence in the ith qubit and E
k
i are the Kraus operators of the noisy channel acting on
the particular qubit, with k, l ∈ {AD,BF, PF,DC}. To quantify the effect of noise we will use a distance based measure, fidelity,
between the quantum state received by the receivers (Alice and Bob here) after the effect of a specific noise channel and the quantum
state expected in the ideal condition, when noisy channel do not alter the quantum state. In fact, in the ideal condition, the state at the
receivers end should be the same prepared by TP. Therefore, the fidelity between the initial (ρ) and final (ρ′) state is
F = 〈ψ|ρ′|ψ〉. (3)
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Here, it is also worth mentioning that the fidelity expression used here is square of the conventional fidelity expression but is also used
widely as a measure ( [36, 49, 50] and references therein). Now, we will discuss the effect of all these noise models on the proposed
schemes.
4.1 Effect of noise on the protocols
It is noteworthy that the qubits used by Alice and Bob to prepare their respective keys undergo the same fate in both the schemes.
Therefore, the discussion what follows is applicable to both orthogonal-state-based QPC and SQPC protocols. Specifically, when
both the qubits of the initial state |ψ±〉 are subjected to AD noise the compact analytic expression of the obtained fidelity is
F =
1
4
(
2 + 2
√
(1− p1) (1− p2)− (p2 + p1) + 2p1p2
)
, (4)
where p1 and p2 are the probabilities of errors in the first and second qubits, respectively. The same calculated for the different choice
of initial state, i.e., |φ±〉is
F =
1
4
(√
1− p1 +
√
1− p2
)
2. (5)
In what follows, the same fidelity expressions are obtained irrespective of the initial choice of Bell state under different noisy
environment.
Similar to the earlier case, when the first qubit evolves under the effect of AD channel, whereas the second qubit is affected by
BF channel the calculated fidelity turns out to be
F =
1
4
(
−2
(
1 +
√
1− p1
)
(−1 + p2) + p1 (−1 + 2p2)
)
. (6)
Similarly, when the first qubit is subjected to AD noise and the second qubit evolves under the effect of PF and DC noise models, we
obtain the fidelity expressions as
F =
1
4
(
2 + 2
√
1− p1 − p1 − 4
√
1− p1p2
)
(7)
and
F =
−2p1 (−1 + p2) +
(
1 +
√
1− p1
)
(−4 + 3p2)
4 (−2 + p2) , (8)
respectively.
Before we consider the effect of other kind of noise models (other than AD) on the first qubit, it is worth noting that the scheme
is symmetric with respect to Alice and Bob (due to the symmetry of the Bell states used), and the similar fidelity expressions are
expected whether the first (second) qubit is affected by AD (BF) or the first (second) qubit is affected by BF (AD) noise. In fact, if
we interchange the values of p1 and p2 we can obtain the fidelity expression of one from the other. Due to this fact, we are enlisting
here only the expressions for fidelity, for those cases which lack this kind of symmetry (i.e., which cannot be obtained from another
expression by simply using a symmetry argument).
If the first qubit is subjected to BF noise, while the second qubit evolves under BF, PF and DC noises, then a systematic compu-
tation would yield the fidelity expressions as
F = 1− p2 + p1 (−1 + 2p2) , (9)
F = (−1 + p1) (−1 + p2) , (10)
and
F =
3
2
− 2p1 + 1− 2p1−2 + p2 , (11)
respectively. It is interesting to report that the fidelity obtained while both the qubits evolve under PF environment is exactly the same
as that under BF noise (9).
If we consider PF noise on the Alice’s qubit and DC noise on the Bob’s qubit we obtain a closed form analytic expression of
fidelity as
F =
(−1 + p1) (−4 + 3p2)
2 (2− p2) . (12)
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Figure 1: The fidelity variation of the quantum states for the QPC protocols in specific cases of noisy environment is shown here. The
smooth (blue), small-dashed (red) and dot dashed (cyan) curves correspond to the fidelity of the obtained states when only Alice’s (or
Bob’s) qubit is subjected to AD, BF and DC noises, respectively. Similarly, the dotted (black), large-dashed (orange) and large-dot
dashed (magenta) lines show variation in the fidelity of the obtained states with probability of errors, when both Alice’s and Bob’s
qubits are subjected to the same kind of noise with equal probabilities of errors, i.e., AD, BF and DC noises, respectively. In both
the cases of PF channels, the same fidelity as that under BF noise is obtained. As discussed in the text the choice of initial Bell states
only matter when both the qubits are subjected to AD noise. Here, the dotted (black) line shows the fidelity variation for the initial
state |ψ±〉 while the small-dashed (red) line corresponds to the initial state |φ±〉.
Finally, when both the qubits are subjected to DC noise, the obtained fidelity between the quantum state affected by noise and the
initial state is
F =
8− 6p2 + p1 (−6 + 5p2)
2 (−2 + p1) (−2 + p2) . (13)
Before we proceed with the analysis of the various fidelity expressions obtained under different combinations of noisy channels,
it is worth establishing the motivation of this study. Specifically, we have already mentioned the fidelity between the initial and final
state in the ideal conditions is expected to be unity. For the sake of argument, consider that one of the channel (either TP to Alice
or TP to Bob) is noiseless, then this unit fidelity falls considerably (cf. Fig. 1). Specially, for the higher values of decoherence
rate, it even becomes null for BF or PF channels. More realistic scenario would be where both the qubits undergo decoherence. For
simplicity of discussion, if we consider that the rate of decoherence in both the channels is the same, then the fidelity of the obtained
state evolving under BF or PF noise turned upside down to become unity for higher probability of errors. Though, a similar benefit
appears when the qubits evolve under AD noise. However, no such advantage is seen in presence of the DC noise.
We have already reported ten fidelity expressions (Eqs. (4)-(13)) calculated for the quantum states shared between all the parties
and evolving under different noise channels. All the analytic expressions depend on two independent variables (probability of error).
Therefore, variation of fidelity with these variables can be explicitly illustrated using contour plots. Specifically, in Figs. 2-5, we
have shown the contour variation of Eqs. (4)-(13). In Fig. 2, the fidelity as a function of both the probabilities pis is shown when the
initial choice of Bell state by TP was |ψ±〉 and |φ±〉 in (a) and (b), respectively. A gradual decay in fidelity with each independent
probability appears in (a), and when both the decoherence rates are higher, relatively better results in terms of fidelity are visible.
Whereas (b) gives a contrasting picture, and fidelity is found to fall continuously with both the probabilities. The comparative analysis
reveals that |ψ±〉 gets less affected than |φ±〉. It may be easily observed in both of these plots (i.e., Figs. 2 (a) and (b)) that the contour
variation is symmetric along a diagonal from lower left to top right corner due to the fact that the same noisy channel is affecting
both the qubits. It will remain valid in all such plots to follow (cf. Figs. 4 (a) and 5 (b)) where the same noise acts on both qubits and
symmetric nature is visible in the contour plots.
If we consider that quantum channel for TP to Alice is characterized as AD while Bob’s qubit is affected by one of the BF, PF
or DC noise, then the symmetry observed in Fig. 2 is lost (cf. Fig. 3 (a), (b), and (c), respectively). The variations of fidelity in all
these cases show that it is not sufficient to characterize one quantum channel, as the type of noise applied to the second qubit is also
relevant. If we look closely at/in these three contour plots (i.e., Fig. 3 (a), (b), and (c)), we can see the same seven contour lines at
the starting point at/on the X-axis undergoing different variation due to the effect of the noisy channel of the second qubit. Among
all these noise models, DC noise is found to minimally affect the fidelity, while PF noise is found to have most devastating effects.
Another possibility is that the first qubit is subjected to BF noise. In Fig. 4 (a), another qubit is also traveling through the BF
channel. Interestingly, the degrading of fidelity with an increase in probability of error in one of the channels can be controlled by
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Figure 2: QPC protocols subjected to AD channels, i.e., both the qubits evolve under AD noise. In (a) and (b), the choice of the
initial Bell state by TP is |ψ±〉 and |φ±〉, respectively.
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Figure 3: QPC protocols subjected to a noisy environment, when the first qubit of the Bell state (Alice’s qubit) is subjected to
AD, while the second (Bob’s) qubit evolves under different noisy channels. In (a), (b), and (c), it evolves under BF, PF, and DC,
respectively.
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increasing the decoherence rate for the other channel. The same intercepts on the X-axis for all three plots correspond to the same
type of noise acting on the first qubit. Unlike the second qubit evolving under BF channel, PF noise does not check the decay in
fidelity (cf. Fig. 4 (b)). In fact, least fidelity is obtained in Fig. 4 (b) when compared among the second qubit evolving under BF, PF,
and DC noise. While the second qubit is subjected to DC noise (Fig. 4 (c)), the fidelity can be further maintained, but the variation
is quite different from Fig. 4 (a).
It should be noted that when the first (second) qubit is subjected to BF (AD) noise contour variation of the fidelity can be obtained
by interchanging the X and Y axes in Fig. 3 (a). Due to this reason, these cases will not be further discussed. Similarly, Fig. 4 (a)
also shows the variation of fidelity when both qubits travel through the PF channels.
Another interesting possibility would be to consider the first and second qubits evolving under PF and DC noise, respectively. It
can be observed from Fig. 5 (a) that DC noise affects the fidelity comparatively less than other noises. Finally, we consider both the
qubits subjected to DC noise in Fig. 5 (b). The symmetric decay in fidelity shown in this case has a specific characteristic that even
the lowest value of the obtained fidelity is an appreciable amount when compared with the remaining cases.
It is also important to observe a comparative analysis of the effect of different kinds of noisy channels. Specifically, if we consider
the first qubit travels through a specific channel with the known rate of error than the effect of noisy environment due to the second
qubit is studied here in two dimensional variation. Specifically, in Fig. 6, we consider two cases (namely, decoherence rate p1 = 0.2
and 0.8) of variation of fidelity with/in error rate for the second channel. The effects of different values of p1 are shown in the figure,
as for its higher value, the fidelity remains the same for initial |ψ±〉 state, while falls sharply for initial |φ±〉. It can be seen that for a
higher rate of damping the effect of noise on the other qubit is hardly relevant (cf. Fig. 6 (b)).
Similarly, when the first qubit evolves under the effect of BF channel with low error rate, the second qubit subjected to DC noise
performed best as shown in Fig. 7 (a). However, in Fig. 7 (b) the second qubit under BF channel outperformed it for higher probability
of error. Interestingly, the two dimensional cut shown in Fig. 7 (b) the fidelity is seen to increase with increasing probabilities of
errors in the second channel.
When the first qubit is fixed to be traveling through a PF channel with intermediate error rate, the second qubit evolving under
DC noise suffers most (cf. Fig. 8). As the fidelity in this case is initially highest for lower values of error in the second channel,
becoming second to the PF channel for higher errors. The obtained fidelity in the same case, i.e., second qubit under DC noise, falls
comprehensively even below AD noise for sufficiently large values of error rates for the second channel.
Finally, we will consider when the first qubit subjected to DC noise in Fig. 9. Here, we can observe that for higher values of
error in the first channel though fidelity in two of the cases appears increasing, but it is consistent with corresponding contour plots
(cf. Figs. 2-5). It is worth commenting here that fidelity obtained when the second qubit is evolving under the BF channel improves
considerably to be better than in damping and DC noise.
So far, we have been discussing the effect of noise on the qubits which are used by Alice and Bob to obtain random key strings.
However, it is also desirable that during eavesdropping checking stage the presence of Eve and noise can be discriminated. This
was the motivation of our last work [35], where we have reported that different suitable choices of decoy qubits and eavesdropping
checking subroutines suitable over different noisy channels. As the GV subroutine was explicitly discussed in Ref. [35], we will only
discuss the effect of noise on the semi-quantum subroutine.
4.2 Effect of noise on semi-quantum subroutine
It is worth noting that unlike BB84 or GV subroutine, where the principle of security varies from each other, in a semi-quantum
subroutine, the security can be inherently achieved by using one of them. Specifically, in a semi-quantum subroutine, a quantum party
prepares the decoy qubits and classical party reflects them to quantum party, who later calculates the error rate for that. Depending
upon the choice of decoy qubits BB84 or GV subroutine can be used.
However, from the point of view of the effect of noise on this subroutine, to and fro communication of decoy qubits should be
considered while studying the effect of noisy environments. Here, for the simplicity of discussion, we will consider the same kind of
noise with the same error rate acting on certain qubit while its to and fro travel.
Specifically, when both the qubits undergo damping during both rounds of travels, the obtained fidelity expressions are
F = 14
(
(−2 + p2) 2 − 2p1 (−2 + p2) (−1 + 2p2) + p21 (1 + 2 (−2 + p2) p2)
)
(14)
and
F =
1
4
(−2 + p1 + p2) 2 (15)
for the initial choice of Bell state as |ψ±〉 and |φ±〉, respectively. In the remaining cases, when the first qubit is subjected to damping
and the second qubit is considered under BF, PF, and DC noises, the obtained fidelity is calculated as
F =
1
4
(−2 + p1)
(−2 + p1 (1− 2p2) 2 − 4 (−1 + p2) p2) , (16)
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Figure 4: QPC protocols subjected to noisy environment, when the first qubit of the Bell state (Alice’s qubit) is subjected to BF,
while the second (Bob’s) qubit evolves under different noisy channels. In (a), (b) and (c) Bob’s qubits is affected by BF, PF, and DC,
respectively. As mentioned in the text (a) also corresponds to the PF noise on both the qubits.
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Figure 5: (a) QPC protocol subjected to a noisy environment, when the first qubit of the Bell state (Alice’s qubit) is subjected to PF
while the second (Bob’s) qubit evolves under DC. (b) Similarly, when both the qubits of the Bell state (i.e., Alice’s and Bob’s qubits)
evolve under the effect of DC noisy environment.
14


Figure 6: The effect of noise on the fidelity obtained in the QPC protocol when the first qubit is subjected to AD noise, while the
second qubit is subjected to different noisy channels. The smooth (blue), large-dashed (orange) lines correspond to the effect of AD
noise on the second qubit for the initial Bell state |ψ±〉 and |φ±〉, respectively. Similarly, the dotted (red), small-dashed (magenta),
large-dot dashed (cyan) curves correspond to the fidelity of the obtained states when Bob’s qubit is subjected to BF, PF and DC
noises, respectively. In (a) and (b), the decoherence rate for the Alice’s channel is 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. In the plots, (also in the
following figures) the probability of error p2 is written as p.
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Figure 7: The effect of noise on the fidelity obtained in the QPC protocol when the first qubit is subjected to BF noise, while the
second qubit is subjected to different noisy channels. The smooth (blue), dotted (red), dashed (magenta), dot dashed (cyan) curves
correspond to the fidelity of the obtained states when Bob’s qubit is subjected to AD, BF, PF and DC noises, respectively. In (a) and
(b), the probability of error in Alice’s channel is 0.2 and 0.8, respectively.
16


Figure 8: The effect of noise on the fidelity obtained in the QPC protocol when the first qubit is subjected to PF noise, while the
second qubit is subjected to different noisy channels. The smooth (blue), dotted (red), dashed (magenta), dot dashed (cyan) curves
correspond to the fidelity of the obtained states when Bob’s qubit is subjected to AD, BF, PF and DC noises, respectively. In (a) and
(b), the probability of error in Alice’s channel is 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.
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Figure 9: The effect of noise on the fidelity obtained in the QPC protocol when the first qubit is subjected to DC noise, while the
second qubit is subjected to different noisy channels. The smooth (blue), dotted (red), dashed (magenta), dot dashed (cyan) curves
correspond to the fidelity of the obtained states when Bob’s qubit is subjected to AD, BF, PF and DC noises, respectively. In (a) and
(b), the probability of error in Alice’s channel is 0.2 and 0.6, respectively.
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Figure 10: The effect of noise on the fidelity of the quantum states used by TP for eavesdropping checking in the SQPC protocol
when the first both the qubits are subjected to AD noise for initial choice of Bell states as |ψ±〉 and |φ±〉 in the smooth (blue) and
dashed (magenta) lines, respectively. The dotted (red) and dot dashed (cyan) curves correspond to the fidelity of the obtained states
when both qubits are affected by BF (equivalently PF) and DC noises, respectively.
F =
1
4
(
(−2 + p1) 2 + 8 (−1 + p1) p2 − 8 (−1 + p1) p22
)
, (17)
and
F =
(−2 + p1)
(−8 + 4p1 (−1 + p2) 2 + (12− 5p2) p2)
4 (−2 + p2) 2 , (18)
respectively. In another case, when the first qubit is subjected to BF channel and second qubit evolves under the effect of BF, PF, and
DC noise the analytic expressions of fidelity are
F = 1− 2p1 (1− 2p2) 2 + 2p21 (1− 2p2) 2 + 2 (−1 + p2) p2, (19)
F = − (1 + 2 (−1 + p1) p1) (1 + 2 (−1 + p2) p2)−1 + (−1 + p1) 2 (−1 + p2) p2 , (20)
and
F = 12(−2+p2)2
[
8− 16p1 (−1 + p2) 2 + 16p21 (−1 + p2) 2 + p2 (−12 + 5p2)
]
, (21)
respectively. Similarly, when the first (second) qubit is affected by PF (DC) noise, then the fidelity can be calculated as
F =
(1 + 2 (−1 + p1) p1) (8 + p2 (−12 + 5p2))
2 (−2 + p2) 2 . (22)
Finally, when both the qubits are subjected to DC noise, we obtain the expression for fidelity as
F = 12(−2+p1)2(−2+p2)2
[
4 (8 + p2 (−12 + 5p2))− 4p1 (12 + p2 (−20 + 9p2)) + p21 (20 + p2 (−36 + 17p2))
]
. (23)
The fidelity expressions for the remaining cases are not explicitly written here, as those expressions can be derived from the above
expressions by symmetry argument. The analysis of the obtained fidelity expression is simplified here by considering the case when
both the qubits are affected by the same kind of noise with the same error rate. In this particular case, as shown in Fig. 10, it is
observed that the fidelity for the damping effect, for |φ±〉 as the initial choice of TP, gradually decays to zero. Further, for the state
evolving over the BF or PF channel, a revival of with an increasing error rate is observed. For the remaining cases (i.e., for |ψ±〉 state
under AD channels and an arbitrary Bell state subjected to DC noise), fidelity falls gradually and becomes constant around p = 0.5.
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5 Conclusion
Two protocols for QPC have been proposed. The essential beauty of the present work underlies in the fact that both of the proposed
protocols for QPC are fundamentally different from all the existing protocols of QPC. Specifically, the first protocol is designed solely
using orthogonal states and the security of the protocol does not rely on conjugate coding. This is interesting because of the fact that
BB84 protocol [51] for QKD and early protocols of secure quantum communication (see Chapter 8 of Ref. [29] for a review), whose
security arise from the fact that one cannot perform simultaneous measurements in mutually unbiased bases (conjugate coding),
led to a perception that unconditional security of QKD and other quantum tasks arises from the conjugate coding (i.e., through the
use of non-orthogonal states as the states prepared in mutually unbiased bases are not orthogonal to each other). Interestingly, in
Refs. [27,43] it has been firmly established that QKD is possible without using non-orthogonal states, i.e., by using orthogonal states
only. Subsequently, a set of orthogonal-state-based protocols for various secure quantum communication tasks has been proposed by
some of the present authors [28–30, 32], and those protocols have established that most of the quantum cryptographic tasks that can
be performed using non-orthogonal states can also be performed using orthogonal states. Specifically, it has been established that one
can perform quantum secure direct communication [29, 30, 32], QKA [28], etc., solely using orthogonal states. These orthogonal-
state-based protocols are fundamentally different from the conjugate coding based schemes as their security does not arise from our
inability to perform simultaneous measurement using two mutually unbiased bases. However, until now, no effort has been made to
design an orthogonal-state-based protocol for QPC. Thus, the first protocol of the present letter is fundamentally different from all
the existing protocols for QPC, and it is unique in that sense. Interestingly, the second protocol proposed here is also an orthogonal-
state-based, but in the case of the second protocol we did not stress much on this characteristic, because it has another unique
characteristic, which has not been explored in any of the existing schemes for QPC: the protocol is semi-quantum in nature, i.e., it
allows some of the users to be classical. These two protocols answer couple of questions (in context of QPC) that are foundationally
important. For example, both the protocol answer: Which quantum properties are essential for the implementation of schemes of
QPC? It establishes that conjugate coding is not required and ensuring simultaneous non-availability of all the pieces of information
to Eve after splitting it into several pieces is sufficient to ensure security of schemes for QPC. Specifically, conjugate-coding-based
schemes achieve security by hiding the basis information of two mutually unbiased bases, whereas an orthogonal-state-based employs
geographical information splitting using PoP technique. The second protocol answers another question: How much quantumness
is needed (or in other words, how many quantum users are needed) to implement a scheme for QPC? It is established that only TP
needs to be quantum and all other users can be classical. This is in sharp contrast to the existing protocols where all the users are
required to be quantum. Thus, the second protocol of ours clearly uses reduced quantum resources, as two parties comparing their
assets are completely classical in nature. However, there exists a trade-off between the amount of quantum resources used and the
qubit efficiency achieved. Specifically, the qubit efficiency of the SQPC protocol (i.e., our second protocol) is found to be much lower
compared to the first protocol where all the users are quantum in nature. Clearly, this happens because in SQPC, a lesser number of
parties possess quantum resources and that increases the requirement of q and b for accomplishing the same task (i.e., to communicate
the same amount of classical information c by following the restrictions of the same cryptographic task).
The feasibility of both of the proposed schemes is analyzed under well-known noise models, such as AD, BF, PF, and DC. The
study has led to many interesting conclusions. In general, the effect of any specific noise model is independent of the choice of the
initial Bell state. However, it is observed that when both the qubits are subjected to AD noise, the fidelity expressions depend on
the parity of the Bell state. Further, the study has established that the quantum state is least affected due to DC illustrated through a
higher value of fidelity. Interestingly, it has also been observed that the higher error rates in one of the quantum channel can also lead
to positive effects. Specifically, a few cases have been observed where the higher decoherence rate in one of the quantum channel
had resulted in higher fidelity compared to the situation having lower error rates in the same channel. Another interesting result has
been obtained when both the qubits were traveling over a BF channel, as in this case a revival in fidelity with increasing error rate in a
quantum channel has been observed. The effect of noise in the eavesdropping checking for SQPC protocol is also considered, as it is
necessary to differentiate between noise and Eve. It has been observed that the parity 1 Bell states have least fidelity when subjected
to AD noise.
Keeping the above in mind, we conclude the letter by noting that a QPC scheme neither requires user other than TP to be quantum,
nor it requires to use the quantum states prepared in mutually unbiased bases. However, to implement a scheme for QPC in a realistic
situation, characterization of the channel (knowledge of noise(s) present in the quantum channel) would play a very important role,
as in the absence of this knowledge, TP may reach to an incorrect conclusion.
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